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d1.   Introduction 
Publicly-supported grants and loans to poor areas have long been an important 
vehicle for development assistance. For example, China’s anti-poverty policies have 
emphasized such poor-area programs since the mid-1980s,
2 motivated by the observation 
that the country’s success against poverty over the last 25 years has been geographically 
uneven, with marked disparities in living standards emerging.
3  Advocates of such 
programs claim that credit constraints in poor areas perpetuate their poverty and that 
targeted aid can relieve those constraints.  By this view, capital-market failures in poor 
areas entail that the investments made under such a program would be infeasible 
otherwise, implying both efficiency and equity gains.   
It remains an open question how much impact can be expected.  While not perfect, 
capital markets may still work well enough to assure that marginal products of capital 
come into rough parity between poor and non-poor areas in steady state.  Then the 
problem of lagging poor areas is not so much lack of capital as low productivity of capital, 
such as due to poor natural conditions, lack of complementary knowledge or skills, or 
poor policies.   
And even with credit constraints, some people are clearly more constrained than 
others.  If those selected are not credit constrained, their participation is voluntary, and 
the interest rate is no different from other credit sources, then there will be no net gain 
from the extra availability of credit.  Heterogeneity in the impacts of such programs can 
also arise from inequalities in the complementary skills or knowledge needed to derive 
benefits from the extra investment.  Beneficiary selection will then be crucial to the 
outcomes.  However, it is not obvious that the selection procedures found in practice 
would “pick the winners.” Beneficiary selection for local development programs has 
come to rely heavily on local community groups.  This practice may well achieve greater 
equality in access to the aid within villages, but possibly at the expense of assuring that 
the aid goes to those who would benefit the most.      
                                                 
2   See (inter alia) Leading Group (1988), World Bank (1992, 1997), Jalan and Ravallion 
(1998) and Park et al. (2002). 
3   See, for example, Knight and Song (1993), Jian et al., (1996), Khan and Riskin (1998), 
Ravallion and Jalan (1996, 1999), World Bank (1992,1997), Kanbur, and Zhang (1999) and 
Ravallion and Chen (2006). 
  2This paper provides the first rigorous assessment of the longer-term impacts of a 
poor-area program.  The program is the World Bank’s Southwest China Poverty 
Reduction Project — the Southwest Program (SWP) for short.  This comprised a package 
of multi-sectoral interventions targeted to poor villages using community-based 
participant and activity selection.  The aim was to achieve a large and sustainable 
reduction in poverty.  The paper reports results from an intensive survey data collection 
effort over 10 years, initiated by two of the authors and done in close collaboration with 
the Rural Survey Organization of China’s National Bureau of Statistics. 
Assessing development aid effectiveness at the project level raises a number of 
challenges.  A long-term commitment to collecting high-quality survey data is crucial, 
but it is not sufficient.  Impact can only be meaningfully assessed relative to a 
counterfactual; our counterfactual is the absence of the SWP, which means that we assess 
the incremental impacts, on top of pre-existing governmental spending. As in any 
observational study, there are concerns about selection bias, i.e., differences in 
counterfactual outcomes between SWP participants and non-participants.  Our data 
collection effort allows us to “difference out” the time-invariant component of the 
selection bias (arising from non-random placement).  However, it is not obvious on a 
priori grounds that the bias would be constant over time, given that the initial village 
characteristics that attract the program (such as poor infrastructure) may also influence 
the growth rate under the counterfactual.  We use both propensity-score weighted 
regression and kernel-matching methods to balance the observable covariates between 
sampled SWP and non-SWP villages.  
A further problem is that aid-financed poor-area development projects are likely 
to violate the common assumption in impact evaluations (both experimental and non-
experimental) of no interference with the comparison units.
4  A plausible source of 
interference in this setting is through local public-spending spillover effects to non-SWP 
villages.  The local government cuts its own development spending in the villages 
targeted for external aid, and the spending is diverted in part at least to the non-
                                                 
4   This assumption is often implicit in impact evaluations but it was made explicit by Rubin 
(1980), who dubbed it the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA is known to 
be implausible in certain bio-medical evaluations.  
  3participants used to form the comparison group. We propose and implement a test for 
spillover effects and we construct a bound for the bias.   
  The paper’s principle finding is that there were sizeable income gains from the 
SWP during its disbursement period, but these gains did not survive four years later.  The 
longer-term impact on mean income is neither large nor statistically significant.  
However, we do find significant gains for some sub-groups, notably those among the 
poor with better schooling.  Our results point to substantial losses from the community-
based beneficiary selection process.  
The following section describes the SWP while sections 3 and 4 describe our data 
and methods.  Section 5 presents the main results while Section 6 draws some lessons for 
future evaluations. 
 
2.  Background on the program  
In 1986, the Government of China designated that about 15% of the country’s 
2,200 counties were “poor counties,” which would receive extra assistance, mainly in the 
form of credit for development projects.  Past research has suggested that the designated 
poor counties are in fact poor (by a range of defensible criteria) and that they have seen 
higher growth rates than one would have otherwise expected (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998; 
Park et al., 2002).  The gains have not been sufficient to reverse the underlying tendency 
for growth divergence (whereby poorer counties tend to have lower growth rates) and 
there is evidence that the impacts on economic growth may have declined in the 1990s 
(Park et al, 2002).  Within these designated poor counties, geographic pockets of extreme 
poverty have persisted to the present day, mainly in upland areas. 
The SWP was introduced in 1995 with the aim of reversing the fortunes of 
selected poor villages in the designated poor counties of Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunnan. 
About one-quarter of the villages were selected for the SWP (1,800 out of 7,600 
villages).  The aim was to choose relatively poor villages within these counties, with 
selection based on objective criteria, although not formulaic.  The selection was done by 
the county government’s project office in consultation with provincial and central 
authorities and the World Bank.  
  4The total outlay on the SWP was US$464 million, which was financed by World 
Bank loans and counterpart funding from China’s central and provincial governments.  
The total investment per capita under the SWP was only slightly lower than mean annual 
income per capita of the project villages.   
As in other World Bank projects, there were numerous appraisal and supervision 
missions by Bank staff and consultants, and these missions often probed quite deeply into 
the project’s local operations, including numerous visits to participating counties and 
villages.  Two of the authors (Chen and Ravallion) participated in some of these missions 
and also revisited a number of the sampled villages over two weeks in May 2005 
(including some that they had visited 10 years earlier) and had informal discussions about 
the SWP with numerous ex-participants.   
Within the selected villages, virtually all households were expected to benefit 
from the infrastructure investments, such as improved rural roads, power lines and piped 
water supply.  Widespread benefits were also expected from the improved social services, 
including upgrading village schools and health clinics, and training of teachers and 
village health-care workers.  Those with school-aged children also received tuition 
subsidies (conditional cash transfers).  Over half of the households in SWP villages also 
received individual loans (accounting for about 60% of disbursements).  The interest rate 
was set at the same level as for loans from the government’s poor-area programs and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, although this is a lower rate than for 
commercial sources of credit.  The loans financed various activities including initiatives 
for raising farm yields, animal husbandry and tree planting.  There was also a component 
for off-farm employment, including voluntary labor mobility to urban areas and support 
for village enterprises.  The selection of project activities aimed to take account of local 
conditions and the expressed preferences of participants, although it is unclear how well 
this worked in practice; there have been reports that farmers’ preferences were sometimes 
over-ruled by local cadres (World Bank, 2003).   
Household selection into the SWP was a less transparent process than village 
selection, which could be based on data and field observations.  The household selection 
was typically done by the pre-existing “farmers’ committee” in each village and was not 
subject to rigorous monitoring.  From our discussions in field work, it appears that credit-
  5worthiness criteria and successful past experience with similar project activities played an 
important role.  No doubt local level connections also played a role.    
In common with other development projects, the SWP provided the capital and 
technical assistance, but it did not provide insurance, and many of the activities are likely 
to entail non-negligible risk; the income gains will depend on a number of contingencies, 
including the vagaries of the weather, uncertain demand for the new products and risks 
associated with out-migration. 
The ex ante expectation was that the SWP would virtually eliminate poverty in 
the selected villages over the longer term.  The World Bank’s Implementation 
Completion Report (ICR) — the final document giving the ex post “self-assessment” of a 
lending operation by the relevant operational unit — claimed that the SWP had a 
substantial impact on poverty, citing survey data indicating that the poverty rate had been 
more than halved in the project areas over 1995-2001 (World Bank, 2003).
5  However, 
the attribution of these gains to the SWP is questionable. The evaluative claims in the 
ICR are reflexive comparisons, which only reveal the true impact under the assumption 
that there would have been no progress against poverty in the absence of the project.  
That assumption must be deemed highly implausible in this setting.  
Ravallion and Chen (2005) studied the impacts of the SWP over the disbursement 
period, 1995-2000, using survey data for 2,000 randomly sampled households in both 
SWP and observationally similar non-SWP villages that had first been surveyed in 1995 
(at the beginning of the project) and then annually until project completion.  On 
comparing income changes in SWP villages with those in the matched non-SWP villages, 
they found an average income gain over five years of around 10% of baseline mean 
income, representing an average rate of return of 9%.  The gains are not as dramatic as 
suggested by the reflexive comparisons in the ICR, but they are still sizeable. 
However, Ravallion and Chen found that a large share of the income gain was 
saved.  On comparing the final year of disbursement with the first, Ravallion and Chen 
found only a modest impact on mean consumption or consumption poverty.  The savings 
rate from the project’s income gains was well above the pre-intervention savings rate. 
                                                 
5   This was confirmed by researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who also 
pointed to a substantial increase in primary school completion rates and a decline in the infant 
mortality rate which they attributed to the SWP (Guobao et al., 2004). 
  6Why was there such a high savings rate from the initial income gains?  A number 
of explanations can be suggested, carrying rather different implications for the long-term 
impact of the SWP.  Possibly households saved more to assure they could repay the 
loans.  That depends on the extent to which repayment was enforced.  While the World 
Bank’s loan is made to the (central) Government of China, and repayment is virtually 
certain, that is not the case for the loans made at local level, where enforcement problems 
are common.  Indeed, local repayment rates on loans for poverty reduction under the 
government’s own program were less than 25% in the three provinces covered under 
SWP.
6  However, it may be that the necessity of the center repaying the World Bank 
“trickled down” in the form of greater local enforcement of SWP repayments than for the 
loans made under the government’s own poor-area programs.   
Another possibility is that the high initial savings rate reflected a perception on 
the part of participants that the longer-term income gains from SWP would be modest or 
uncertain at best — raising concerns about the sustainability of the program’s impacts.
7  
When interpreted in terms of the Permanent Income Hypothesis, the Ravallion-Chen 
findings imply that participants felt that a large share of the income gain was transient, 
and (hence) it was saved.  While this would happen even without uncertainty about the 
future income gains, such uncertainty is likely, and would probably lead to precautionary 
saving in response to the project.
8  In this regard, it is instructive that Ravallion and Chen 
found large year-to-year differences in impact, which were primarily due to variability in 
the annual returns to the program’s investments rather than the level of investment.  This 
variability in the returns suggests that participants would have had a hard time assessing 
the program’s impact on permanent income.   
The transient-income explanation suggests that the income impacts of SWP would 
diminish appreciably after disbursement.  Precautionary saving would also start to fall as 
                                                 
6   The repayment rates on loans for poverty reduction in 1997 ranged from 8% in Yunnan 
to 23% in Guizhou. Repayment rates were somewhat higher for other types of loans but the 
overall average was still only 30% (Government of China, 1998). 
7   The ICR rated “sustainability” as “highly likely.” The Bank’s internal evaluation of SWP 
by its Operations Evaluation Department pointed to the need for further evidence on the longer-
term sustainability and impact of SWP.  
8   There is evidence of precautionary savings in response to uninsured risk in the same 
region of rural China; see Jalan and Ravallion (2001).   
  7participants learn more about the impacts.  Consumption gains should become evident in 
due course, consistent with the project’s underlying impact on permanent income.  
  There is another explanation for the high savings rate from the short-term income 
gains.  This postulates that the SWP systematically alters the returns-to-saving in the 
participating villages.  By this view, the project provided local public goods that 
increased the marginal product of private capital, and so stimulated higher savings to 
support the desired private investment, which would yield longer-term income gains 
beyond the life of the project.
9  This assumes that there are capital-market imperfections, 
which entail that investment depends on own-savings and that the marginal products of 
private capital are not equalized across locations. With the poor facing severe constraints 
on access to credit and yet having higher marginal products of capital in their own (farm 
and non-farm) enterprises (given low capital stocks and concave production functions) 
one might expect to see a sizeable (and pro-poor) investment response.  Clearly, this 
explanation offers a more positive view of the prospects of a sustained impact on poverty 
from the SWP, in that it suggests that income gains will persist well beyond the 
disbursement period (as the returns to investment start to be realized) and that sustainable 
consumption gains would emerge.   
By re-surveying in 2004/05 the same sample studied by Ravallion and Chen 
(2005) we hope to throw light on which of these explanations is most plausible.    
 
3. Data   
The original plan for the impact evaluation of SWP was to do a baseline survey in 
1995 and to only do follow-up surveys during the Bank’s disbursement period, up to 
2000.  However, we decided to re-survey the original sampled households in 2004/05, to 
try to resolve the issues about longer-term impact raised by Ravallion and Chen (2005) 
and discussed in the previous section.   
All surveys were implemented by the Rural Household Survey (RHS) team of the 
government’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  The surveys covered 2,000 
randomly-sampled households in 200 villages, with roughly half not participating in the 
                                                 
9   Jalan and Ravallion (2002) provide a micro model of growth with imperfect capital 
markets that is consistent with this property, and find supportive evidence in the same region of 
rural China. 
  8SWP.  All villages were in counties covered under the government’s poor-area program, 
to assure that we will identify the impact of the SWP, on top of the government’s 
program.  There are 112 SWP villages and 86 non-SWP villages.
10  The SWP villages 
were a random sample from all project villages, while the non-SWP villages were a 
random sample from all other villages in the designated poor counties. Ten randomly 
sampled households were interviewed in each village.   
The 1996-2000 and 2004/05 surveys included community, household and 
individual questionnaires.  The community schedule collected data on natural conditions, 
infrastructure and access to services.  The household survey collected data on (inter alia) 
incomes, consumptions and assets.  The individual questionnaires covered gender, age, 
education and occupation.  A data set was collected from 1997 to 2001 on development 
project activities (both SWP and under other existing government programs).  There are 
34 project activities identified in these data, in seven categories (farming, animal 
husbandry, forestry, infrastructure, education, health and labor migration).
11   
We follow Ravallion and Chen (2005) in using 1996 as the baseline.  There are 
serious comparability problems between the 1995 survey and later surveys.
12  As a 
baseline, the 1996 data are not free of contamination; 17% of the program’s total 
disbursement on household projects had been made by the end of 1996.  We check 
robustness to using 1995 as the baseline. 
Relative to other household surveys, unusual effort went into obtaining accurate 
estimates of consumption and income from the 1996-2000 and 2004/05 surveys.  While 
the community, individual and project activity surveys used conventional one-time 
interviews, the household survey was quite different.  The household surveys from 1996 
onwards were closely modeled on NBS’s Rural Household Survey (RHS) (which is 
                                                 
10   In the 2004/05 survey, two villages (one SWP and one not) were inadvertently replaced 
by two different villages in the same township.  
11   A project activity survey in 1998 also gathered information about the scale and the 
starting year of each SWP sub-project at village and household level, as well as data on other 
funding these villages and households received from the government and other sources. 
12   Because of delays in NBS being told the locations of SWP villages, the first survey in 
December 1995 had to use a one-time interview method, asking recall over the full year. The use 
of this long recall period is likely to lead to underestimation of income and consumption (though 
this is of less concern for village-level characteristics). The subsequent surveys used the daily-
diary method over the full year, allowing more accurate income and consumption data.   
  9described in detail in Chen and Ravallion, 1996).  This is a good quality budget and 
income survey, notable in the care that goes into reducing both sampling and non-
sampling errors.   Similarly to the RHS, sampled households maintain a daily record on 
all transactions plus log books on production.  Local interviewing assistants visited each 
household at two-three weekly intervals, at which time inconsistencies found at the local 
(county-level) NBS office are checked.  Other trained interviewers also visited at regular 
intervals to collect additional data.  This intensive interviewing method is a marked 
contrast to most surveys in which the respondent is visited only once or twice. 
The consumption aggregate is built up from very detailed data on cash spending 
on all commodities and imputed values of in-kind spending, which is mainly 
consumption from household production, valued at local selling prices. Living 
expenditures exclude spending on production inputs (which are accounted for in net 
income from own-production activities).  They also exclude transfer payments, though 
these only account for a small share of total spending (3.7% over the whole sample in 
1996).  The income aggregate includes cash income from all sources and imputed values 
for in-kind income.  Income is measured net of all production costs, including interest on 
debt (including loans from the SWP).  The migrant workers were not tracked, although 
the income aggregate includes remittances received from family members who migrated, 
including those supported by the SWP. Remittances are expected to be the main means 
by which the out-migration component reduced poverty in the short run.  
Given the unusual effort that went into data collecting and checking the 
consumption and income data, we expect that subtracting consumption from income will 
give reasonably accurate estimates of savings.   We also look into what forms the savings 
took.  There are many forms of saving in this setting, including money balances and 
investment in own-production activities.  The survey was not designed to allow a 
complete independent accounting of all forms of saving.  Some data were collected on 
assets and liabilities, although the reliability of the reported values is questionable.  We 
also study impacts on holdings of specific assets. 
  For the 2004/05 follow-up survey we used exactly the same survey instrument as 
for the 1996-2000 surveys, augmented with a module to elicit perceptions of both welfare 
and the project’s impacts.  The module asked respondents to assess whether various 
  10aspects of their lives had improved over the preceding 10 years.  (The questions in this 
module were asked in 2005.)  These involved a long list of aspects of well-being and in 
each case the respondent was asked whether this item had improved or not over the last 
10 years, on a 10 point scale (from “extremely worse off” to “extremely better off”).
13  
(The sample was restricted to adults who were at least 28 years of age at the time of the 
interview.)  Our idea here is to see whether such a rapid appraisal tool — which does not 
require any prior surveys, including a baseline — gives similar results to our more costly 
longitudinal survey-based method.   
  Over 1996-2005, the attrition rate was 12% (6% over 2000-05). Using a probit 
model for attrition over 1996-2005 we found a number of significant predictors, 
including age of head, share of children, landholding and some geographic variables.
14  
(Being an SWP village was not a significant predictor of attrition.)  NBS survey teams 
were instructed to find replacement households as similar as possible to those that 
dropped out.  We also tested how well this replacement worked, using a regression for 
the probability of being a replacement household estimated on the pooled sample of 
replacement and “drop-out” households.
15 Among the same set of covariates for attrition, 
no regressor was a significant predictor for replacement and the regression has very low 
overall explanatory power.  It appears that the sample with replacements can be 
considered representative of the population. 
  We checked the robustness of our results to several potential data problems.  One 
problem concerns the aggregation of total living expenditures.  It appears that in 
processing the 2004/05 survey data, living expenditure in one county may have failed to 
include in-kind consumption.
16 The data for three other households whose in-kind 
income was more than six times larger than their total living expenditure seem to have a 
similar problem.  We re-estimated the impacts on consumption and income, dropping this 
                                                 
13   The Chinese and local language versions of the module were refined over time on the 
basis of field tests in poor villages in a number of locations.  
14   A statistical addendum is available from the authors giving full details. 
15   Note that we have baseline data for the “drop-outs” and the current year’s data for the 
replacements. To deal with the time difference we did a pro-rata adjustment of the data on drop-
outs to 2004 values according to the ratios of the means over time for each variable, based on the 
balanced panel.  In caculating the ratios, we also weighted by the attrition probability.   
16   We suspect there is a problem because the total living expenditure of 68% the sample in 
that county is equal to cash expenditure, whereas net in-kind income is about half of overall total.  
  11one county and the three households. The results reported below were robust to this 
change (details available from the authors). 
Another potential data problem is related to the coding of SWP projects.  We find 
in the village-level project data base that all ten villages in one county claim to have a 
project funded by the SWP, even though six of them were officially designated as non-
SWP villages.
17  It may well be that there was significant SWP participation by villages 
that had not been selected for the project in this particular county (although we cannot 
rule out coding errors). On deleting this county we found that our main results were 
robust (details are available from the authors). 
 
4.  Estimation methods and sources of bias  
Our aim is to estimate average treatment effects on the treated.  The double-
difference (“difference-in-difference”) method identifies a project’s impact under the 
assumption that the selection bias (the counterfactual difference in outcomes) is constant 
over time and additive in its effect on outcomes.  In the present context, we point to two 
sources of time-varying selection bias: (i) outcome changes are correlated with initial 
differences between the participating and non-participating areas, and (ii) spillover 
effects, whereby the project itself alters the subsequent path of outcomes for the non-
participants.   
4.1  Biases due to targeting 
Let us begin with the classic evaluation problem.  We have data on an outcome 
measure  for the i’th unit observed at dates, t=0,1.  Each unit is observed to be either a 
participant ( ) or non-participant (
it Y
1 = it T 0 = it T ).  We can write the outcome measure as:  
it it
C
it it G T Y Y + =    (t=0,1; i=1,…,N)      (1)   
where   is the gain (“impact”),   is the outcome under treatment and   
is the counterfactual outcome.  is not directly observable for any i (or in expectation) 











it Y 0 = it T  and   for 
C
it Y 1 = it T .  The selection bias is the mean 
difference in counterfactual outcomes (dropping the i subscripts):   
                                                 
17   There are scattered minor reports of SWP activity in non-SWP villages elsewhere, but 
these appear to be random, and are probably coding errors. 




t t           ( 2 )  
We call this the unconditional bias, given that we have not yet allowed for control 
variables.  Given the purposive targeting of the SWP it must be presumed that  .  0 ≠ t B
The standard double-difference estimator assumes that  0 1 B B = , implying that the 
change in mean gains for period 1 participants is consistently estimated by:  
] 1 | [ ] 0 | ) [( ] 1 | ) [( 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 = − = = − − = − = T G G E T Y Y E T Y Y E DD
C C T T  (3) 
If period 0 is a true baseline, with  0 0 = i T  for all i (by definition), then   for all i, 
and so , i.e., mean impact on the treated units.   
C
i i Y Y 0 0 =
) 1 | ( 1 1 = = T G E DD
However, time-invariant unconditional bias ( 0 1 B B = ) is implausible for poor-area 
development programs.  The targeted poor areas typically lack infrastructure and other 
initial endowments, which could (in turn) affect the subsequent growth rates.  DD will 
then be a biased estimator, since the subsequent outcome changes are a function of initial 
conditions that also influenced the assignment of the sample between the two groups.  In 
other words, the selection bias will not be constant over time.
18   
The direction of bias in DD depends on whether the underlying growth process is 
convergent or divergent.  For the government’s poor-area programs in southwest China in 
the 1980s, Jalan and Ravallion (1998) found that failure to control for the initial 
heterogeneity between the targeted counties and non-participating counties yields a 
downward bias in a DD estimator, consistent with growth divergence.
19  However, it is 
unclear whether this also holds across villages within the same (poor) counties; indeed, 
the results of Jalan and Ravallion (2002) (also for southwest China) suggest that inter-
county divergence can occur side-by-side with intra-county convergence.   
We address this issue by balancing treatment and comparison units in terms of the 
initial conditions that may have influenced program placement.  These variables are 
represented by the vector X.  Our key identifying assumption is that the selection bias is 
time-invariant conditional on X, i.e., that:    
        (4)  ) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | ( ) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | ( 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 X T Y E X T Y E X T Y E X T Y E
C C C C = − = = = − =
                                                 
18   This echoes more general concerns about the importance of correcting for selection bias 
based on observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1998). 
19   Also see Jalan and Ravallion (2002) who find evidence of divergence at the county level.  
  13On applying a result due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if outcome changes are 
independent of participation given X,
  then they are also independent of participation 
given the propensity score:  ) 1 Pr( ) ( i i i X T X P = = ,   ) 1 ) ( 0 ( < < i X P .  This justifies 
balancing on P(X) to remove selection bias based on X.   Note that this only addresses 
time-varying selection bias based on observables; a bias will remain if there are any latent 
(time-varying) factors correlated with the changes in counterfactual outcomes.  As 
discussed later, a remaining bias due to unobservables appears to be more likely for 
household selection than village selection.    
We use various methods for assuring balance on P(X).  One method is to limit 
comparisons to a trimmed sub-sample with sufficient overlap in propensity scores.  For 
our data, the region of common support (minimum score for treated, maximum score for 
untreated) is (0.11, 0.95).  For our “trimmed sample” we chose a slightly tighter interval 
(0.1, 0.9), which are also the efficiency bounds recommended by Crump et al. (2006) for 
estimating average treatment effects with minimum variance.
20   
We also use the weighted-regression method proposed by Hirano, Imbens and 
Ridder (2003).  Thus we estimate the DD from the following regression:  
it t i i it T t T DD Y ε δ β α + + + + = 1 1 .  ( t=0,1; i=1,…,N)    (5)   
where  0 ) ( 1 = i i T E ε .  This is estimated with weights of unity for treated units and 
 for controls, where   is a consistent estimate of P(X) and 
.  Hirano et al. show that weighting the controls this way yields an efficient 
estimator.
)) ( ˆ 1 /( ) ( ˆ X P X P −
1 ) ( ˆ 0 < < X P
) ( ˆ X P
21  We estimate (5) on both the pooled sample (for t=0,1 and including 
replacement households) and for both the total sample and trimmed sample.   
                                                 
20   Using the formula in Crump et al. (2006), the exact bounds are 0.0997 and 0.9003.  For 
estimating the average treatment effect on the treated Crump et al. also recommend dropping 
treatment units with scores less than about 0.8 (for our data), but keeping all un-treated units.  We 
did not follow this recommendation.  For one thing, we felt that this entailed the loss of too many 
treatment villages, raising concerns about inference for the population of treated villages. 
Secondly, our balancing tests performed better when we also deleted the low-score untreated 
villages, which are clearly poor comparison units.     
21   If we wish to estimate the average treatment effect for the population, the weights are 
for the treated units and  for the controls (Hirano and Imbens, 2002).  ) ( ˆ / 1 X P )) ( ˆ 1 /( 1 X P −
  14To interpret (5) note that, in a balanced panel, we could instead estimate the 
equivalent regression in the more familiar “fixed-effects” form:  
           ( 6 )   it i t i it t T DD Y ν η δ α + + + + = 1
* .
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* .  Thus, 1 i T β  in (5) picks up differences in the mean of the latent individual 
effects, such as would arise from initial selection into the program.  The advantage of (5) 
is that it does not require a balanced panel, and hence it gives estimates that are robust to 
selective attrition (recalling that the replacements appear to have preserved the sample’s 
ability to represent the population).  
As a robustness check, we compare these estimates with matching on the 
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where   is the number of SWP participants,   is the number of control observations, 




j’th non-participants in making 
a comparison with the i’th participant.  How many non-participants to include in the 
control group and how to assign weights to each non-participants are practical questions 
in implementing PSM.  One option is to use the popular method of nearest-neighbor 
matching.  However, because of the non-smoothness of nearest neighbor matching, the 
conventional bootstrapping method is inappropriate for estimating the standard errors 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006).  In order to assure valid bootstrapped standard errors, we 
choose to apply nonparametric kernel matching in which all the non-participants are used 
as controls and weights are assigned according to a kernel function of the predicted 
propensity score (following Heckman et al., 1997, 1998).  The weights can be written as 
, where  , in which  ∑k ik ij K W = ij K / ) / ˆ ) ( ˆ (( n j ij a P X P K K − = )) ( i X ) (⋅ K  is a kernel 
function and   a bandwidth parameter. We use the normal density function as the kernel 
and the odds ratio (rather than propensity score) because SWP villages are over-sampled 
relative to their frequency in the population eligible for the project.  
n a
  15The conditional independence assumption motivates a specification test of 
whether there are differences in observables between the project and non-project villages 
after conditioning on   through matching or re-weighting.  Following Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985) and Abadie and Imbens (2006) we test for covariate balancing using 
differences in standardized means between the SWP villages and matched or re-weighted 
non-SWP villages. To achieve a better balance of covariates and to allow for a more 
flexible estimate of propensity scores, we also include polynomial terms for the initial 
income levels (see, for example, Smith and Todd, 2005).  We will show that the matching 
and re-weighting procedures produce a satisfactory balancing of the observables between 
SWP and comparison villages. 
) (X P
4.2  Biases due to spillover effects 
All the methods described above assume that an observationally similar 
comparison group pre-intervention reveals the counterfactual of what would have 
happened over time to mean outcomes for the treatment group in the absence of the 
intervention.  This will clearly not be the case if there are any spillover effects, whereby 
the intervention changes outcomes for non-participants.   
  Spillover effects due to residential mobility between villages are unlikely in this 
setting given the village-level administrative land allocation.  Under China’s rural land 
laws, a migrating household would have little prospect of getting a share of the land 
available (and almost certainly cultivated) at the destination and would also risk losing 
their land at the origin.   
Another source of spillover effects is inter-village trade (possibly via urban hubs). 
To the extent that the project has an impact on local incomes and prices, trade-induced 
general equilibrium effects will entail spillover effects to the non-SWP villages used to 
infer the counterfactual.  We will test for impacts on prices as well as incomes, 
distinguishing cash-incomes (as derived from inter-village trade) and incomes-in-kind. 
Local public spending responses to project aid can also be confounding.  Recall 
that there were other development activities supported by the local (county and 
provincial) governments, side-by-side with the aid-financed SWP.  Non-SWP villages 
could then be affected by a SWP-induced re-allocation of public spending by local 
authorities.  If the SWP does not have a lasting impact then the bias will probably be 
  16confined to the disbursement period.  However, if there are lasting impacts (observable to 
local authorities) then one would expect the local spending response to the SWP to 
continue beyond the disbursement period. 
A theoretical model of the local public spending response to external aid can help 
inform an assessment of the likely bias.  Let   denote the local government’s 
spending on its own poor-area development programs in village j=SW, NSW, which index 
the SWP (project) and non-SWP (comparison) villages, and total spending is 
. (We treat the two groups as having equal size but this does 
not change the main result as long as the group sizes are fixed.)  The external aid 
provides extra spending in the amount AID in the project villages, so that total spending 
on poor-area programs in the SWP villages is 
j GOV
GOV
NSW SW GOV GOV GOV + =
AID SW + .  The local government has 
a preference ordering over its spending allocation across the two sets of villages and its 
spending on all other activities, denoted Z.  The preference ordering is represented by:  
) , , ( Z GOV AID GOV W NSW SW +  and this function is strictly increasing in all three 
elements, and strictly concave in all three; it simplifies the analytics if we also assume 
that the function is additively separable, though this can be weakened.  The local 
government maximizes W subject to its local revenue constraint, which creates an upper 
bound on GOV+Z.   Under these assumptions we have the following result (that is proved 
in Appendix 1): 
Proposition: The external aid will displace local government spending in the 
project villages, increase spending in the comparison villages, but decrease total 
local government spending across both sets of villages.   
The implication for our evaluation is plain: Comparing outcome changes over time 
between SWP and (matched) non-SWP villages in the same counties will under-estimate 
the project’s true impact. 
We will test for spillover effects. The presence of non-SWP development projects 
in the SWP villages provides the clue.  We use the same evaluation methods described 
above, but the “outcome variable” becomes the extent of non-SWP project activity in the 
SWP villages. The theoretical result in the above proposition will be exploited in 
determining an upper bound to the bias induced by spillover effects, 
  175. Estimated  impacts 
Table 1 gives mean income and consumption and the poverty rates for 1996, 2000 
and 2004/05.  The poverty line of 808 yuan per person per year in 1995 prices 
(corresponding to the $1 a day line used by Ravallion and Chen, 2005, at 1993 
purchasing power parity) as well as poverty lines above and below this figure.  We see 
that the income gains in SWP villages between 1996 and 2000 were larger than among 
non-SWP villages, but that this reverses between 2000 and 2004/05.  Ten years after its 
commencement, the SWP does not appear to have allowed the selected poor villages to 
catch up with the rest of these (poor) counties.   
Table 1 suggests that SWP had little or no impact on income and consumption.  
However, before accepting that conclusion we need to probe more deeply into the 
potential sources of bias described in the previous section.  We begin with selection bias 
due to non-random placement of the SWP.  At the end of this section we test for bias due 
to contaminating spillover effects. 
5.1  Probits for selection into the SWP 
Table 2 gives probits for whether a village was selected for SWP, as used to 
estimate the propensity scores.  The variables were chosen to reflect the selection criteria 
used by the project staff (based on our interviews at the time). 
We find that project villages tend to be in more hilly/mountainous areas, are less 
likely to have electricity, less likely to have a school in the village or nearby, though 
more likely to have a health clinic within the village relative to nearby.
22  The SWP 
villages also tend to have larger populations, with lower mean income in 1995 (from the 
village-level data), lower mean consumption in 1995 (from the household survey) and 
more land per capita.  The latter characteristic probably reflects lower population density 
and lower land quality in the project villages.  In most respects, the results of Table 2 
suggest that the SWP villages tend to be poorer than other villages within the project 
counties, consistently with Table 1.   
Using the propensity scores based on Table 2 to re-weight the data we were able 
to obtain a close balancing of the characteristics of the two samples (including in the 
                                                 
22   Remote villages are more likely to have a very basic health clinic, to compensate for the 
inaccessibility to more comprehensive township facilities. 
  18means of the initial outcome variables), particularly after trimming the samples, as 
discussed in the previous section.  Appendix 2 provides details on the balancing tests, 
which pass comfortably; this was also the case for a full set of covariates in Table 2, for 
which the balancing tests are reported in the Addendum available from the authors. 
5.2  Double-difference estimates of average impacts 
In assessing impacts on mean consumption and income, we begin with the simple 
DD estimates of the mean impacts for income, consumption and saving, as given in Table 
3.  We give estimates for both 2000 (at the end of disbursements) and 2004/05 and for 
both the levels and the logs; the latter gives higher weight to the gains to poorer 
households.  The baseline is 1996 in both cases. 
  Focusing first on the disbursement period, we see a sizeable and statistically 
significant impact on income but not consumption; the bulk of the income gain was 
saved.  (The same pattern was found using 1995 as the baseline.)  On decomposing 
income (as wage income, farming, animal husbandry, fishery, forestry, non-farm 
enterprises, transfers and asset income), the only component that showed a statistically 
significant impact was animal husbandry, for which the simple DD impact on net income 
was 90.85 yuan (t=2.92), which rose to 117.26 (t=3.37) and 136.15 (t=3.55) using 
weighting and matching (respectively) to correct for selection bias (Table 4).
23   
Another way of disaggregating income is into cash or kind (which will be relevant 
when we consider trade spillovers in section 5.4).  We found that the bulk of the short-
term income impact was income in-kind from animal husbandry, as is evident from Table 
4.  This is puzzling, as a sizeable share of income-in-kind from husbandry in a rural 
economy is also consumed directly, and should then show up in consumption.  However, 
the income in-kind that is being affected by the project appears to be small non-
productive animals and new litters of productive animals, which are counted as income in 
kind but are held over for consumption or sale at a later date rather than consumed.
24  We 
will return to this point when we discuss the longer-term impacts. 
                                                 
23   We only report the results for husbandry, and summarize those for other components; a 
statistical addendum is available with full details. 
24   We do not have data on this, but the practice of counting such animals as income in-kind 
is discussed in the manual for enumerators provided by NBS. 
  19We can also disaggregate consumption expenditure.  On separating food staples 
(rice, wheat etc) from non-staples and other foods we found significant impacts in 2000 
for non-staple foods (meat, vegetables etc); the simple DD for this category was 26.26 
yuan (t=1.68) though rising to 40.64 yuan (t=2.69) and 42.58 yuan (t=2.70) for the PS 
weighted and kernel matched estimators respectively.  This is likely to entail nutritional 
gains through higher protein and more micro-nutrients.      
The results change dramatically when we track the impacts through to 2004/05, as 
is evident when we return to Table 3. We find no significant impacts on mean income or 
consumption over the longer observation period.
25  (This also was also true for staples 
and non-staples separately.) Table 3 also gives the DD estimates for mean income using 
the propensity scores to balance project and non-project villages; we give results using 
both weighting and matching, for both end dates, and for both the trimmed sample and 
total sample.  The basic pattern in the simple DD estimates is still evident.  The results 
are robust to using kernel matching instead of the re-weighted regression method.
26     
While there is clearly some sensitivity to the choice of estimation method, the 
pattern is still reasonably robust, indicating significant and sizeable income gains during 
the disbursement period but much less in the longer term.  The estimated income gains in 
2000 tend to be larger when we correct for purposive selection of SWP villages; this is 
consistent with a divergent growth process between villages.  However, no such pattern is 
evident for the 2004/05 impacts. 
We did find significant longer-term impacts on income in-kind.  On breaking up 
income in-kind by source, we found that both farming and husbandry accounted for 
almost all these long-run impacts, though only husbandry was significant (Table 4). The 
simple DD estimate of impact in 2004/05 on income in-kind was 130.30 yuan (t=2.11), 
though this fell somewhat when we corrected for selection; with weighting we obtained 
DD=111.90 (t=1.89) while with matching, DD=96.98 (t=1.78).  We found no other 
significant impacts in the long run amongst cash income components.  
                                                 
25   The same pattern was evident using 1995 as the baseline, although impacts were 
somewhat lower. 
26   The results were also robust to deleting the troublesome county and the observations with  
problematic data (section 3).  
  20In contrast to the period up to 2000, we find consumption gains in the post-
disbursement period.  The impact on total consumption in 2004/05 is not statistically 
significant (Table 3).  However, when we break this up according to cash or kind, we do 
find signs of larger impacts on consumption in kind. The simple DD estimate for 
consumption in kind in 2004/05 is 118.40 yuan (t=2.54), although this drops appreciably 
when we correct for selection bias; using PS weighting the impact is 74.46 (t=1.50).  The 
longer-term impacts on consumption in kind probably include consumption of the income 
in-kind from animal husbandry that we observed in the SWP disbursement period.   
For either the simple DD or the score-weighted DD, the consumption gains 
exceed what one could reasonably expect under the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) 
if the income gains from SWP were purely transient.  For then the consumption gains in 
the four-year period following SWP would simply be the rate of interest times the 
permanent-income equivalent of the transient income gain.  For the simple and score-
weighted DD, plausible rates of interest would imply lower consumption gains than we 
see in Table 3, although this is not true for the kernel-matched DD for which the post-
disbursement consumption gains equal the increment to permanent income at a rate of 
interest of about 10%. Statistically, however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
post-disbursement consumption gain equals the increment to permanent income (at 
reasonable interest rates) treating the SWP income gain as transient.    
The PIH interpretation begs the question as to why we saw no consumption gains 
in the disbursement period.  If SWP participants knew at the outset that the project would 
entail only a transient income gain then consumption would have immediately reflected 
the implied gain to permanent income.  However, from what we know about the SWP, it 
is unlikely that participants could have formed a reliable estimate of the gain to 
permanent income due to SWP until at least project completion.  As noted in section 2, 
there was considerable uncertainty about the income gains, and high initial savings may 
have been a short-term precautionary response.  
We found no evidence of impacts on interest payments on loans or the proportion 
of households paying interest or paying back loans, for either 2000 or 2004/05.
 27  So we 
find no support for the idea that either the high savings from the short-term gains or the 
                                                 
27   Again we only summarize the results here; the addendum gives full details. 
  21lower longer-term impacts on incomes stem from greater enforcement of interest or 
repayment requirements under the SWP, compared to other credit sources.  
With weak enforcement of the SWP loan repayments, it might be conjectured that 
taxes on SWP areas would increase, to help local authorities pay back the SWP loans to 
higher levels of government.  However, we did not find any evidence of impacts on taxes 
or fees paid per capita, in either 2000 or 2004.  It appears that higher levels of 
government treated the SWP as, in large part, a transfer payment to lower levels.  
In testing for impacts on agricultural productivity, we used total farm income per 
unit area.
28  We found no evidence of impacts.  Nor did we find much evidence of 
impacts on holdings of productive assets and wealth (including housing). This was true 
for both the disbursement period and the longer-term. An exception is that the village 
data base revealed a significant impact on livestock holdings, notably cows and goats.
29  
There is some sign of a demographic impact.  Household size fell in both SWP 
and non-SWP villages over 1996-2000, but more so in the former.  The simple DD for 
household size is -0.13 persons (t=-1.75) and it is slightly larger with the corrections for 
selection bias (the PS-weighted estimate is -0.16, t=-1.64, and it was similar for kernel 
matching).  The demographic effect was associated with slightly fewer children.  
However, the demographic impact was not evident in 2004. 
  Nor did we find any evidence of impacts on remittances received from family 
members migrating out, or on the probability of a family member migrating.
30   
We did find significant impacts on school enrolment rates during the 
disbursement period; our PS-weighted DD estimate was 0.074 (with a t-ratio of 2.20), 
i.e., a 7.4% point increase in the school enrollment rate of children aged 6-14 by the year 
                                                 
28   Ideally we would use physical output for a given crop per unit area under its cultivation.  
However, only total land area under cultivation was collected.  Instead we used an overall farm 
productivity measure, obtained by dividing total net income from farming by total cultivated area; 
this can be interpreted as a mean crop-specific yields weighted by both prices and shares of land. 
29   The simple DD for cows per person in 2000 was 0.05 (t-ratio=2.47); with score-
weighting it rose to 0.07 (t=3.54) and it was the same with kernel matching (t=4.33). By 2004 the 
impacts were slightly higher and equally significant statistically; the simple DD estimate was 0.07 
(t=3.69) while the score-weighting the impact was 0.09 (t=4.05) and with kernel matching it was 
0.10 (t=3.92).  Significant impacts were also evident for sheep, although with lower t-ratios. 
30   Out migration in the previous year is only measured for those present in the village at the 
time of the interview, although NBS made an effort to ask the individual questions at times of the 
year when migrants are more likely to be present.  Remittances may well be the better indicator. 
  222000 is attributed to SWP.
31  However, this impact had dropped substantially by 2004/05; 
the corresponding DD estimate fell to 0.032 (t=1.00).  The transient schooling impact 
probably reflects the fact that the tuition subsidies ended with other SWP disbursements.  
Of course, even though the non-SWP village caught up substantially with the SWP 
villages in schooling by 2004/05.  Thus there were children in SWP villages who entered 
school earlier than without the SWP and this will probably yield future income gains.   
There was almost no sign of impacts on the prices of agricultural outputs and 
purchase prices for inputs for 13 items.
32  We found positive impacts during the 
disbursement period for a number of types of infrastructure, although they are generally 
not statistically significant.  We found little sign of impacts in the 2004/05 data. The 
exception was TV reception, which showed significant impacts in the longer-term as well 
as during the disbursement period.     
Table 5(a) gives the estimated impacts on the incidence of income poverty for 
various poverty lines; Table 5(b) gives the corresponding results for consumption 
poverty.  Again we give estimates using the poverty line of 808 yuan per person per year 
as well as selected poverty lines above and below this figure.
33  The poverty impacts in 
the SWP disbursement period are broadly consistent with our findings for the impacts on 
the mean income and consumption in Table 3.
34  In Figure 1 we also give the results 
graphically, by plotting the DD estimate of the impact on the headcount index of poverty 
(for income and consumption poverty in panels (a) and (b) respectively) against the 
poverty line, which we vary over virtually the whole distribution.  Impacts on the income 
poverty rate are largest just below the 808 poverty line, for both end dates.  The impacts 
on consumption poverty echo our results for mean consumption around the middle of the 
range of poverty lines, where 2004/05 consumption-poverty impacts exceed those for 
                                                 
31   The uncorrected DD was 0.046 (t=1.41) and the kernel matched DD was 0.072 (t=2.40). 
32   The only exceptions were that diesel oil had a significantly higher price in the SWP 
villages by 2004/05 and edible oil crop had a slightly lower price.   
33   The table only gives results for the trimmed sample, which is better balanced.  However, 
although the precise estimates differ between the two samples, the basic pattern was the same, 
and our main conclusions do not depend on this choice. 
34   The results were also robust to deleting the county in which some SWP activity was 
recorded in non-SWP villages.  We found an impact on extreme consumption poverty in 2004 
after deleting the consumption outliers ( The weighted DD at 500 consumption poverty line is -
8.06 with t-ratio of -1.72; the weighted DD at 600 is -9.20 with t-ratio of -1.67.) 
  232000; the results imply a sizeable nine percentage point drop in the consumption poverty 
rate at poverty lines around 600 yuan.  However, this is not true at lower and higher lines, 
where impacts over the two time periods agree fairly closely. 
  For all of the above impact estimates, the counterfactual is the absence of the 
SWP.  There is an alternative counterfactual of interest, namely the absence of direct 
participation in any anti-poverty program, including the government’s programs.  For 
identifying this counterfactual we can use those households in non-SWP villages who did 
not participate in any other program; this applied to 69% of the households in non-SWP 
villages. So we repeated the above calculations dropping those who recorded any direct 
participation in other programs.  (The balancing tests passed comfortably.)  The impacts 
for 2000 were similar to those above.  However, the long-run impacts on mean income 
and consumption were larger.  For example, the simple DD estimate of the impact on 
mean income in 2004 rose to 125 yuan per person (as compared to 45 yuan in Table 5) 
although this fell to 99 yuan when we corrected for selection bias using PS weighting.  
Nonetheless, the impacts relative to this alternative counterfactual were still not 
significantly different from zero; for example, the t-ratio on the simple DD for mean 
income was 1.47, which dropped to 1.13 with PS weighting.    
5.3  Heterogeneity in impacts 
We tested for differences in impacts according to the initial values of income, 
education and ethnicity.
35  The score-weighted DD’s were not significantly different for 
any of our outcome variables when we stratified by education or ethnicity.  However, we 
found a notable difference when stratified by initial income (above or below the median), 
with significant longer term gains for the low-income group.  When we interacted income 
with education we found that the longer-term gains were strongest for the relatively well 
educated (at least junior high school) amongst the low-income households, as can be seen 
in Table 6.   
The heterogeneity in returns suggests that a different assignment of the loans 
would have increased overall impact. The household participation rate was slightly higher 
for the group of relatively poor but well educated households; 61.1% of this group in 
                                                 
35   We distinguish Han Chinese from all other ethnic minorities.  The ICR points to concerns 
about how well ethnic minorities were reached by the SWP (World Bank, 2003). 
  24SWP villages participated, as compared to 58.8% of those with above median income and 
higher education, 50.0% of those with high income but low schooling, and 47.8% of 
those with both low income and schooling. (The program slightly favored better educated 
households both above and below median income.)  Suppose that beneficiary selection 
had focused solely on the relatively well-educated poor, and saturated this group, with no 
change to conditional mean impacts by subgroup, which were zero for other groups 
(consistently with Table 6).  Then the impact of the program as a whole would have risen 
substantially, from a mean impact of about 40 yuan per person to about 150 yuan.
36  To 
achieve this outcome, the program would have had to over-ride the community-based 
selection process, which evidently put too little weight on reaching the educated poor, 
even though this group was already favored in the selection process.         
While we found no impacts on average remittances and out-migration, significant 
positive impacts were evident when we stratified by initial income and education; the 
impacts  were significant for those who were initially above median income and (among 
those with above-median income) were larger for those with more schooling. 
5.4  Are we underestimating the impacts due to spillover effects? 
Biases in long-term impact estimates can arise from interference due to spillover 
effects, as discussed in section 4.2.  Our results do not offer much support to the idea of 
trade-induced spillover effects.  We have seen that there were no significant impacts on 
prices, although it might be argued that arbitrage eliminated any price differentials. More 
damaging to the notion that there were significant trade-spillovers across villages is the 
fact that we did not find significant impacts on cash income, even during the 
disbursement period; the short-term income gains were in kind, and mainly from animal 
husbandry.  Since inter-village trade is likely to involve cash, there must be a 
presumption that such trade was affected rather little by SWP. 
What about bias due to the responses of the local political economy?  From the 
data on project activities, we counted the number of new non-SWP projects of each type 
that started between 1996 and 2001 (inclusive).  (So this is the change in the number of 
non-SWP projects during the period.)  For the loans made to households, the project data 
                                                 
36   This is based on an impact of about 200 Yuan for this group (Table 5), scaled down by 
25% to reflect the number of households in this group, which would then represent 75% of the 
total number of SWP participants. 
  25also give counts of the total number of beneficiary households.  However, we cannot tell 
what happened in the post-disbursement period since it was only possible to collect the 
project data we use for these calculations during the SWP disbursement period.   
Table 7 gives the results for various project activities.
37  Large displacement 
effects are evident for virtually all non-SWP activities.
38  For most categories, the mean 
in SWP villages is half or less that in non-SWP villages, implying that 40% or more of 
the non-SWP spending allocation to SWP villages was cut, and re-allocated to non-SWP 
villages.
39  Such large displacement effects would imply that the benefits of the SWP are 
likely to have spilled over to our comparison villages, leading us to under-estimate the 
impacts of SWP.   
How large is the bias in our estimates of the impact on income due to these 
spillover effects?  We shall assume that the displacement is entirely within the same 
county; that is plausible given that the county government is the key decision maker in 
the sub-county allocation.  Invoking the theoretical result in section 4.2, we expect that 
total government spending (in both project and comparison villages) will also fall.  In 
other words spending is expected to rise in the comparison villages by less than the 
amount that had been displaced in the project villages.  To determine an upper bound to 
the bias we can assume that the increase in spending in the comparison villages exactly 
equaled the displaced spending in the project villages.  In this case we will be over-
estimating the bias due to spillover effects.  
To help throw light on the likely magnitude of bias due to spillover effects, let 
GOV denote the spending done under the government’s own program, expressed as 
spending per capita of the total population.  Some of this spending is done in SWP 
villages and some is in the non-SWP villages;   where 
w is the population share of the SWP villages while   and   denote the 
NSW SW GOV w wGOV GOV ) 1 ( − + =
SW GOV NSW GOV
                                                 
37   The main activities excluded are minor infrastructure projects none of which showed any 
significant displacement. When there is no response from a village for a specific activity we treat 
it as a zero; this is plausible, although we test robustness to treating it as a missing value.   
38   We repeated these tests using the total samples and treating all cases in which no entry 
was made as missing values.  The results in Table 9 were reasonably robust. (The effects tended 
to be stronger under the alternative treatment of “no response” entries.) 
39   Recall that about one quarter of villages in SWP counties received the aid project, so that 
a non-SWP village will receive, on average, one third of the displaced spending. 
  26observed (post-SWP) levels of government spending in SWP and non-SWP villages 
respectively (per capita of the relevant population). We assume that in the absence of the 
SWP there would be no difference in the level of the government’s spending between 
these two types of villages.  The amount of displacement of non-SWP spending in SWP 
villages that is attributed to the SWP is then  . ) 1 )( ( w GOV GOV SW NSW − −
) SW NSW GOV − NSW R
) SW GOV −
SW
40 The bias in 
the double-difference estimate is   where   is the income 
rate of return to the government’s projects.




41  The true impact is thus:  
*
NSW R DD DD + =           (8) 
On noting that   where   is the true rate of return to the SWP and the 
external aid-financed investment is   per capita in the SWP villages, we can then 
derive the following formula for the proportionate bias: 









* * 1 δ − =
AID
GOV






= δ     (9)   where 
and where   and  NSW SW GOV GOV k / ≡ SW wAID AID = . There will be no bias if there is no 
displacement (k=1), or the SWP is negligible in size (w=0) or the rate of return to the 
displaced government investment is zero ( ).    0 = NSW R
DD DD RSW /
*
However, this is still not a usable formula for determining an upper bound for the 
bias since the measured rate of return to SWP spending will also be contaminated by the 
spillover effect.
 (We assume that the bias due to the local-spending spillover effects 
induced by the external aid only contaminates estimates of the rate of return to that aid.) 
The true rate of return is  .  Substituting into (9) and solving we have:  RSW
* =






NSW δ + =1
*
                                                
AID
GOV
       ( 1 0 )  
 
40   Note that if   is the per capita government spending displaced from SWP villages then 




) 1 /( w Sw −
GOVNSW =
S GOV GOVSW − =
) 1 /( w Sw GOV −
41   Note that   and   are the 
measured income gains where the * denotes the values without the spillovers. Also note that  
 and  . The following result is then easily derived. 




SW Y DD Δ =
) 1 /(
* w Sw R Y Y NSW NSW NSW − + Δ = Δ
*
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  27What are seemingly plausible values for the parameters of (10)?  Jalan and 
Ravallion (1998) estimated an average rate of return of 12% for the Government’s poor 
area development program in the same region of China over 1985-90.  Using different 
methods, Park et al., (2002) also estimate a rate of return to the Government’s national 
poor-area program of 12% in the period 1992-95.  Using the same data, and similar 
methods to the present study, Ravallion and Chen (2005) estimated that the rate of return 
to the SWP spending during the disbursement period was  .  So we set 
.  One-quarter of villages in the poor countries participated in SWP, so 
w=0.25.  Based on Table 7 we can take k=1/3 to be a reasonable lower-bound (noting that 
 is strictly increasing in k).
% 9 = SW R
33 . 1 / = SW NSW R R
* / DD DD
42  So  2 . 0 = δ . The level of investment per capita 
under the non-SWP projects is about half of than under SWP ( ) 
implying that  .
5 . 0 = SW AID / GOV
2 / = AID
R
GOV
53 . 1 /
* = DD DD
43  Inserting these numbers into equation (9) we obtain 
 (implying  ).   % 14
* = SW
   So allowing for spillover effects could yield as much as a 50% larger income 
gain attributed to the SWP during the disbursement period.  The bias-corrected simple 
DD estimate of the income gain during the disbursement period could rise to about 200 
yuan per person, from 130 yuan.  In principle, the consumption gains could also be biased, 
although, given that we find virtually zero (indeed negative) consumption impacts in the 
disbursement period, our conclusion that the income gains were fully saved remains 
unaffected. 
The more interesting question concerns the post-disbursement period. Recall that 
the tests for displacement in Table 7 do not cover the post-disbursement period. It might 
be expected that the local spending balance between the treatment and comparison 
villages would be restored once the external aid ceased.  Although the data used in Table 
7 are not available for 2004/05, we can at least test for long-term impacts on new loan 
activity from non-SWP sources, as an indication of whether the SWP displaced other 
                                                 
42   Using the project data base to comparing average loan amounts for non-SWP in SWP 
villages with those in non-SWP villages gives k=0.58. 
43   According to the project data, mean lending per capita under non-SWP projects (whether 
in SWP or non-SWP villages) represents 53% of the corresponding mean loan under the SWP 
(per capita of the population in SWP villages).  
  28sources of finance in the post-disbursement period. (In 1995 we know who had received 
SWP loans so we can net this out of total loans received.  Of course, in 2004/05 there 
were no new SWP loans.)  By these calculations, we found no significant impacts on 
non-SWP loans in 2004/05.  This does not suggest there was long-term displacement of 
other sources of finance. 
While the displacement effect is presumably greater in the disbursement period, it 
cannot be ruled out post-disbursement.  If there are in fact longer-term gains from the 
SWP and this is known locally then continuing positive displacement will be expected, 
making it harder to identify those gains.  However, even the upper bound to the bias 
derived above of   is well short of being sufficient to imply a significant 
long-term impact on mean income; assuming that the standard error is not biased by the 
spillover effect, one would need to quadruple the income gain in 2004 before it could be 
deemed statistically significant.  
5 . 1 /
* = DD DD
   
6. Conclusions 
  The longer-term impacts of aid to poor areas depend crucially on why these areas 
are poor in the first place.  If persistently poor areas arise from generalized capital-market 
failures then external aid can relieve the credit constraints and so enhance long-run 
growth.  If instead the credit market failures are specific to certain (liquidity-constrained) 
subgroups of the population then the aid will need to be targeted to those groups. 
However, persistently poor areas can arise from other causes, such as governance failures 
or (possibly policy-induced) distortions in other markets (including labor, such as due to 
restrictions on migration). Heterogeneity in impacts can also interact with the beneficiary 
selection process in a way that attenuates the aggregate impact. 
So the benefits from extra aid to poor areas may well be modest. Unfortunately, 
the absence of rigorous studies of the long-term impacts of aid to poor areas has left a gap 
in our knowledge about both the causes of geographically concentrated poverty and aid 
effectiveness.     
To help fill this gap in knowledge, we have used a specially designed set of high-
quality surveys collected over a 10 year period to study the impacts of a World Bank-
financed poor-area development program in southwest China.  We find a sizeable and 
  29statistically significant impact on mean household income in the participating villages 
during the disbursement period.  However, there was a much smaller impact on 
consumption during that period; the short-term income gains were largely saved 
(although with some improvements in diet quality).  Four years after disbursements had 
ended, both project and non-project villages had seen sizeable economic gains, with only 
modest net gain to mean income attributed to the project.  Indeed, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the longer-term average impact was in fact zero, although we do find 
evidence of longer-term impacts on income in-kind from animal husbandry.   
The most plausible interpretation of our findings appears to be as follows.  The 
high savings rate from the initial income gains reflected uncertainty about the future 
impacts — no doubt compounded by the uncertainty about the project’s loan repayment 
and interest obligations, given uncertain contract enforcement at local level.  Farm 
animals were clearly an important form of saving as well as being the main source of the 
short-term income gains.  No doubt the relevant uncertainties were resolved in the longer 
term.  Productivity gains turned out to be small. The initial income gains proved to be 
transient for most households, although there was some persistence in the income gains 
from animal husbandry.  The mean consumption gains over the longer period are in 
rough accord with what one would expect from the (modest) increment to permanent 
income attributable to the project.   
We highlight three findings that raise broader issues for development programs. 
First, heterogeneity in impacts can play an important role in explaining poor overall 
outcomes. We find that there were significant and lasting income gains among the subset 
of households who were initially poor and relatively well educated. Presumably these 
households had more productive investment options, which could not be financed 
otherwise given the liquidity constraints facing the poorest.  The program’s community-
based selection process favored the better educated, but expanded coverage of those who 
were also poor could have greatly enhanced the program’s overall impact.  Given the 
heterogeneity in returns, the implied (ex-post) deficiencies of the community-based 
selection process help explain the program’s disappointing overall impact.  While the 
program performed well in selecting poor villages, overall impacts were greatly 
attenuated by inadequate coverage of the (educated) poor within poor villages.    
  30This finding points to a potentially serious trade-off facing such programs.  The 
desirability of more participatory processes of local beneficiary selection may well come 
at a large cost to overall impacts, including on poverty.  To assure larger impacts one 
would need to over-ride this process by dictating the types of households that should be 
targeted, based on the likely benefits to them. (In the program studied here, it appears that 
the presence of complementary skills and knowledge, as proxied by education, was 
crucial to the impact.) Whether that is feasible or not in practice is a moot point.    
Second, our results point to the importance of taking account of the participants’ 
inter-temporal behavior, such as in response to the uninsured risks often associated with a 
development project.  Those responses can cloud impacts in both experimental and non-
experimental evaluations.  An evaluation that focused solely on the income or 
consumption gains during the disbursement period (as is commonly the case) can give a 
deceptive picture of the true impacts.     
Third, our findings illustrate how the responses of local development agents can 
cloud identification of the long-term impacts of geographically-placed projects (whether 
randomly placed or targeted).  We found evidence of positive spillover effects on the 
comparison villages through the displacement of other development spending during the 
program’s disbursement period.  Such interference suggests that the classic impact 
evaluation methods will systematically underestimate the impact.  In our case, the biases 
could well be substantial, although it is unlikely that these effects are imparting a 
sufficiently large bias on our impact estimates (under seemingly plausible assumptions) 
to overturn our main qualitative results.  But this may well be a bigger problem in other 
settings.   
 
  31Appendix 1: Proof of the proposition in Section 4.2 
The problem is to maximize  ) , , ( Z GOV AID GOV W NSW SW +  s.t. 
R Z GOV GOV NSW SW ≤ + +
(GOV W SW SW
, where R is the local government’s revenue.  The first-order 
conditions  for  an  optimum  require  that:        
   ) (Z WZ ) AID = +         ( A 1 . 1 )  
 )        ( A 1 . 2 )   ( ) ( Z W GOV W Z NSW NSW =
(in obvious notation).  By the implicit function theorem, to optimal levels of   and Z 
are functions of AID. Differentiating (A1.1) and (A1.2) totally with respect to AID we 
have: 
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where   is the second derivative of W w.r.t.  ,   is the second derivative of 
W w.r.t.   and   is the second derivative of W w.r.t. Z.  Solving (A2.1) and 
(A2.2) we have: 
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Summing (A3.1) and (A3.2) we also have: 
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Where  .  Proposition 1 follows immediately.  0 > + + ≡ NN ZZ ZZ SS NN SS W W W W W W J
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  35              Figure 1: Impacts on poverty (trimmed sample) 
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  36Table 1: Summary statistics on outcome indicators 
 














Mean  income  996.061  1158.319 1263.412 1223.698 1390.766 1518.963 
  (715.402) (604.914) (910.036) (669.843) (902.030) (930.867) 
Mean  consumption  843.559 945.201 943.550  1023.352  1130.588  1211.973 
  (469.555) (445.787) (566.183) (698.428) (794.167) (795.499) 
Income  poverty  rate        
Poverty line=600 yuan  0.222   0.127   0.138  0.112  0.123   0.095  
  (0.416) (0.332) (0.345) (0.316) (0.329) (0.294) 
                      808 yuan  0.453  0.306  0.290  0.262  0.242  0.182 
  (0.498) (0.461) (0.454) (0.440) (0.429) (0.386) 
                     1000 yuan  0.614   0.456   0.449  0.415  0.369   0.290  
  (0.487) (0.498) (0.497) (0.493) (0.483) (0.454) 
Consumption  poverty  rate       
Poverty  line=600  yuan  0.290 0.183 0.276 0.219 0.179 0.135 
  (0.454) (0.387) (0.447) (0.414) (0.384) (0.342) 
                      808 yuan  0.576  0.454  0.509  0.441  0.385  0.317 
  (0.494) (0.498) (0.500) (0.497) (0.487) (0.465) 
                     1000 yuan  0.757  0.648  0.675  0.627  0.537  0.468 
  (0.429) (0.478) (0.468) (0.484) (0.499) (0.499) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  Income, consumption and poverty measures are weighted by 
household size. There are 112 project villages and 86 comparison villages. The mean of income/expenditure is Yuan 
per capita per year at 1995 prices. 
  37Table 2: Probit regression of village participation in the SWP using baseline covariates 
 
 Coeff.  z-value 
Village on the plains  Reference category 
Hills 4.876  (4.02) 
Mountainous 2.771  (3.05) 
Whether village has electricity  -0.672  (-1.82) 
…telephones -0.070  (-0.2) 
…road passing through it  0.215  (0.59) 
…radio transmitters  0.352  (1.09) 
Whether village can receive TV transmission  0.237  (0.82) 
Located <5km from the nearest market  0.028  (0.05) 
…5-10 km from the nearest market  -0.494  (-0.94) 
…10-20 km from the nearest market  0.740  (0.95) 
…>20km  Reference category 
# of days in a cycle during which the market assembles  -0.115  (-0.76) 
County town within 5 km  Reference category 
Distance from village to county town is 5-10km  1.373  (1.95) 
…10-20km -0.530  (-0.85) 
>20km -0.448  (-0.83) 
Township=village  Reference category 
Distance from village to township is within 5km  0.137  (0.19) 
…5-10km 0.229  (0.34) 
…10-20km -1.628  (-2.55) 
Main mode of transportation used by the villager: bicycle  -0.296  (-0.4) 
…bus -0.305  (-0.9) 
…other automobile  0.913  (1.71) 
…walking  Reference category 
Nearest train station is within 5 km  -0.586  (-0.62) 
…5-10km 0.999  (1.39) 
…10-20km 1.111  (1.52) 
>20km  Reference category 
Nearest bus station is within 5 km  0.021  (0.07) 
…5-10km 0.265  (0.64) 
…10-20km 0.469  (1) 
…>20km  Reference category 
Whether village has a day-care center  0.724  (1.38) 
Elementary school is in village  Reference category 
Nearest elementary school is within 5km  0.055  (0.16) 
…5-10km 0.737  (1.6) 
Middle school is in village  Reference category 
Nearest middle school is within 5 km  1.026  (2.09) 
…5-10km 0.142  (0.21) 
…10-20km 1.551  (1.63) 
…>20km 0.882  (1.13) 
Medical clinic in village  Reference category 
Nearest medical clinic is within 5 km  -1.026  (-2.79) 
…5-10km -0.420  (-1.11) 
…10-20km -0.820  (-1.24) 
…>20km -0.997  (-1.46) 
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Total population of the village  0.000  (1.99) 
Irrigated land (mu)  -0.001  (-2.8) 
Forest land (mu)  0.000  (-0.87) 
# of people work in TVE over # of labor  0.139  (1.99) 
Whether village has TVE  -0.798  (-1.35) 
Output of grain per capita (kg/person)  0.001  (1.52) 
Net income per capita  0.020  (2) 
Net income per capita squared  0.000  (-1.97) 
Net income per capita cube  0.000  (1.66) 
(End of year) # of pigs per person  0.972  (1.75) 
(End of year) # of cows per person  0.840  (0.7) 
(End of year) # of sheep, goat per person  0.531  (1.12) 
(End of year) # of poultry per person  0.419  (2.54) 
(End of year) # of hone been per person  -5.412  (-2.27) 
Workforce per capita  0.036  (1.4) 
Average household size  -0.042  (-1) 
Share of workforce female  -0.082  (-1.68) 
Cultivated land per capita (mu)  1.438  (3.19) 
Grassland per capita (mu)  1.887  (1.43) 
Village mean of consumption (log)  -0.493  (0.198) 
Village mean of school enrollment (age 6-14)  -2.029  (-2.84) 
Guangxi 1.394  (2.73) 
Guizhou 0.659  (0.92) 
Yunnan  Reference category 
Intercept -2.522  (-0.88) 
Pseudo-R2 0.360 
Note: The village is the unit of observation (n=200) and all explanatory variables are pre-
intervention (1995). Standard errors are adjusted for cluster at county level. Table 3: Impact of SWP on household income and consumption using propensity-score weighting or matching  


















Trimmed sample               
2000 income  981.906  196.322  66.012  130.31  1.826  182.655  2.541  169.150  2.392 
 consumption  (C)  841.729  67.092  70.480  -3.388  -0.067  -17.662  -0.313  -45.762  -0.751 
  saving  (S)  140.223  129.185 -4.525 133.711  2.107  200.333  2.723 214.93  2.685 
2004/05 income  981.906  432.325  387.399  44.926  0.500  42.975  0.455  42.234  0.549 
  consumption  841.729  345.947 287.687  58.26 0.870 58.535 0.786  18.312 0.223 
  saving  140.223 86.333  99.655  -13.322  -0.159  -15.544 -0.18  23.941 0.289 
                   
2000 log  income  6.747  0.18  0.051  0.128  2.046  0.161  2.395  0.133  2.251 
  log  consumption  6.629  0.058 0.019 0.040  0.755  0.031  0.537  0.001  0.003 
  log(1+S/C)  0.117  0.120 0.031 0.089  1.79  0.131  2.467  0.133  2.617 
2004/05  log  income  6.747  0.345 0.264 0.081  1.171  0.062  0.823  0.038  0.522 
  log  consumption  6.629  0.299 0.210 0.090  1.707  0.067  1.130  0.025  0.474 
 log(1+S/C)  0.117  0.046  0.055  -0.009  -0.148  -0.005  -0.078  0.014  0.263 
Total sample               
2000  income  989.45  273.962 65.379 208.583  3.346  213.605  3.287 192.731  2.985 
  consumption  (C)  843.559  99.991  78.151  21.84  0.510 -151.054 -1.180  -189.569 -1.427 
  saving  (S)  145.934  173.928 -12.828 186.755  3.141  364.696 3.371 382.342  3.612 
2004/05 income  989.45  401.316  360.644  40.673  0.537  -47.159  -0.423  -45.246  -0.344 
 consumption  843.559  287.029  266.772  20.258  0.371  36.752  0.633  25.893  0.439 
 saving  145.934  114.244  93.816  20.427  0.303  -83.874  -0.705  -71.097  -0.52 
                   
2000  log  income  6.752  0.230 0.050 0.180  3.448  0.180  3.337  0.160  3.221 
  log  consumption  6.631  0.087 0.028 0.059  1.374  -0.046  -0.577  -0.081  -0.945 
  log(1+S/C)  0.121  0.143 0.021 0.122  2.727  0.227  3.568  0.241  3.615 
2004/05  log  income  6.752  0.310 0.231 0.078  1.314  -0.005  -0.064  -0.01  -0.112 
  log  consumption  6.631  0.223 0.188 0.035  0.682  0.021  0.388  0.007  0.115 
    log(1+S/C)  0.121  0.087 0.043 0.044  0.915  -0.026  -0.307  -0.017  -0.185 
Notes: All the calculations are weighted by household size.  T-ratio of kernel matching is obtained from bootstrapping (100 repetitions). Standard errors of  
weighted D-D estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of households within each village. In the total sample, there are 112 project 
villages and 86 comparison villages.   In the trimmed sample, there are 71 project villages and 66 comparison villages. 
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Table 4: Impacts on income from animal husbandry  
 
  
Revenue or costs from 















2000  total revenue   326.983  107.6  33.894  73.706  2.302  100.03  2.703  118.883  2.498 
  total cost of production  190.901  -15.516  1.623  -17.139 -0.801  -17.229 -0.779 -17.271  -0.717 
  net income from AH  136.082  123.117  32.271  90.845  2.924  117.26  3.373  136.154  3.551 
  cash income (net)  142.204  12.411  1.587  10.824 0.663  14.684 0.858 -2.356 -0.685 
  in-kind income (net)  -6.123  110.705  30.684  80.021  2.79  102.575  3.099  125.853  2.895 
2004 total  revenue  326.983  196.889  225.753  -28.864 -0.507  -1.357  -0.023 12.356  0.246 
  total cost of production  190.901  80.772  121.847  -41.075 -1.196  -36.175 -1.031 -42.896  -1.285 
  net  income    136.082 116.118  103.906  12.212 0.282  34.818 0.785 55.252  1.344 
  cash income (net)  142.204  103.745  150.839  -47.093 -1.025  -30.646 -0.578 3.219  0.641 
   in-kind income (net)  -6.123  12.372  -46.932  59.305  2.033  65.464  1.805  74.179  1.705 
Notes: All the calculations are weighted by household size.  T-ratio of kernel matching is obtained from bootstrapping (100 repetitions). Standard 
errors of  weighted D-D estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of households within each village.  The trimmed sample is 
used, for which there are 71 project villages and 66 comparison villages. 



















(1)-(2)      
Double 
difference  t-ratio 
(a) Income poverty 
2000 
500 14.584  -6.747  0.957  -7.704  -2.138 
600 22.762  -7.331  -1.672  -5.659  -1.247 
700 35.116  -13.093  1.490  -14.582  -2.824 
808 46.697  -15.713  -4.599  -11.114  -1.515 
900 55.047  -15.193  -4.771  -10.422  -1.581 
1000 62.025  -12.906  -3.606  -9.300  -1.395 
1100 68.973  -10.802 1.642  -12.444  -2.195 
1150 72.405  -9.981 2.484  -12.465  -2.256 
2004/05 
500 14.584  -8.053  -5.021  -3.032  -0.809 
600 22.762  -12.250  -6.779  -5.470  -0.857 
700 35.116  -19.410  -11.533  -7.877  -1.046 
808 46.697  -24.907  -19.276  -5.630  -0.693 
900 55.047  -26.344  -22.915  -3.429  -0.444 
1000 62.025  -28.097  -23.816  -4.281  -0.530 
1100 68.973  -27.623  -19.537  -8.086  -1.352 
1150 72.405  -28.378  -20.347  -8.031  -1.424 
(b) Consumption poverty 
2000 
500 18.673  -2.695  6.111  -8.806  -1.691 
600 29.053  0.078 5.298  -5.221  -0.841 
700 40.749  1.140 1.088 0.052 0.006 
808  57.392 -5.266 -1.902 -3.364 -0.386 
900  67.000 -5.761 -0.715 -5.046 -0.734 
1000  75.665 -6.102 -4.570 -1.532 -0.248 
1100 80.898  -4.987  -5.782 0.796 0.164 
1150  83.586 -5.184 -3.569 -1.615 -0.347 
2004/05 
500  18.673  -11.537  -4.081 -7.456 -1.500 
600  29.053  -16.661  -7.918 -8.743 -1.536 
700 40.749  -18.226  -13.352  -4.874  -0.747 
808 57.392  -23.241  -19.095  -4.146  -0.584 
900 67.000  -24.439  -22.567  -1.872  -0.267 
1000 75.665  -25.936  -23.121  -2.815  -0.520 
1100 80.898  -24.192  -21.455  -2.737  -0.511 
1150 83.586  -22.006  -17.962  -4.044  -0.789 
Notes: All the calculations are weighted by household size. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of households within 
each village. The trimmed sample is used with 71 project villages and 66 
comparison villages. 
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      Lower education group  Higher education group 







group (1)  t-ratio 






group (2)  t-ratio 
Weighted 
triple 
difference   
(1)-(2)  t-ratio 
Initial income below median 
2000 income    643.538 81.686 1.015 645.831 207.958 2.525 -126.271 -1.491
 consumption    664.573 -43.809 -0.593 674.167 55.069 0.604 -98.878 -1.246
 saving    -20.989 125.518 2.167 -28.290 152.875 1.460 -27.357 -0.291
  productive assets   413.096 -58.508 -0.753 311.452 86.098 1.424 -144.606 -1.737
  housing value   501.121 -39.476 -0.189 611.993 173.552 0.959 -213.028 -0.947
2004/05 income    643.538 43.687 0.319 645.831 197.933 2.026 -154.246 -1.079
 consumption    664.573 97.623 1.188 674.167 219.517 2.370 -121.894 -1.105
 saving    -20.989 -53.914 -0.521 -28.290 -21.598 -0.247 -32.316 -0.277
  productive assets   413.096 80.478 0.752 311.452 134.206 1.985 -53.728 -0.446
  housing value   501.121 216.285 0.866 611.993 815.739 2.481 -599.454 -2.022
Number of households  312 (173+139) 299 (169+130)
Initial income above median 
2000 income    1465.163 305.638 1.535 1476.474 174.261 1.194 131.376 0.587
 consumption    1061.494 -237.040 -1.268 1170.625 -8.934 -0.071 -228.105 -0.979
 saving    403.747 542.693 1.720 305.881 183.215 1.375 359.479 1.086
  productive assets   600.292 -160.040 -1.775 609.010 -34.391 -0.374 -125.649 -1.054
  housing value   842.872 343.787 1.768 1109.570 60.008 0.303 283.780 1.118
2004/05 income    1465.163 -27.644 -0.133 1476.474 -54.414 -0.348 26.770 0.107
 consumption    1061.494 -24.752 -0.179 1170.625 -136.847 -0.913 112.095 0.637
 saving    403.747 -2.876 -0.015 305.881 82.452 0.493 -85.328 -0.389
  productive assets   600.292 120.572 1.089 609.010 -201.500 -1.258 322.072 1.816
  housing value   842.872 432.315 0.874 1109.570 -697.603 -0.910 1129.918 1.331
Number of households  204 (97+107) 363 (170+193)
Notes:  The numbers parentheses are the number of observations in SWP villages and non-SWP villages respectively.  Estimation is made on a balanced  
panel of 1178 households on the trimmed sample.  Lower education is defined as household head education level being lower than junior high school 
 (illiterate or primary school). Higher education is defined as household head education level being at lest junior high school. Standard errors of weighted D-D 
estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of households within each village.  Balanced panel in trimmed sample is used with 67 project 
villages and 62 comparison villag









matched diff.  t-ratio 
Farming              
Number  of  projects  0.79  2.11  -1.32  -2.45 -1.68 -2.09 -2.04  -2.03 
Number of households   147.63  399.44  -251.80  -2.48  -182.99  -2.43  -205.03  -2.05 
Animal husbandry              
Number  of  projects  1.51  3.03  -1.52  -2.08 -2.21 -1.98 -2.38  -1.78 
Number  of  households  135.09  324.87  -189.78  -1.17 -94.99 -1.18 -62.14  -1.00 
Forestry              
Number  of  projects  0.54  1.34  -0.79  -2.50 -1.50 -1.84 -2.28  -1.66 
Number of households  131.63  296.63  -165.00  -1.41  -120.06  -1.97  -117.65  -3.15 
Infrastructure              
Terracing    0.12  0.65  -0.53  -2.08 -0.94 -1.58 -1.35  -1.46 
Drinking  water  0.31  0.90  -0.59  -3.04 -0.86 -2.58 -1.04  -2.54 
Irrigation    0.24  0.60  -0.36  -1.80 -0.30 -1.42 -0.27  -1.31 
Electricity  0.28  0.58  -0.30  -2.21 -0.49 -2.01 -0.61  -1.52 
Roads  0.19  0.39  -0.20  -1.89 -0.24 -1.39 -0.25  -1.53 
Student subsidies: No.  0.82  2.35  -1.53  -3.03 -1.74 -2.79 -1.75  -2.83 
New schools: No.  0.35  0.79  -0.44  -2.10 -0.55 -1.96 -0.84  -2.06 
Teacher training: No.  0.07  0.37  -0.30  -1.87 -0.39 -2.25 -0.37  -2.26 
Health insurance  0.16  0.31  -0.14  -2.05 -0.12 -1.26 -0.05  -0.69 
New clinic  0.06  0.24  -0.18  -3.84 -0.12 -1.85 -0.09  -1.46 
Doctor  training  0.07  0.26  -0.18  -1.62 -0.18 -1.56 -0.12  -1.23 
Total no. projects  6.07  14.81  -8.73 -3.25 -11.72 -2.45 -13.68  -2.14 
Total no. households  415.38  1026.10  -610.71  -1.74 -399.02 -2.22 -386.20  -2.98 
Notes:  Trimmed sample, treating “no response” as “no project”.  T-ratio of kernel matching is obtained from bootstrapping (100 repetitions). Standard errors of 
D-D and weighted D-D estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of villages within each county.  Trimmed sample is used with  71 
project villages and 65 comparison villages. 
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Appendix 2: Balancing tests for village characteristics and household outcomes with and without weighting and trimming 
 
    Difference in standardized means 
   Standardized means*  Un-weighted   
PS weighted for 
total sample 
PS kernel- 
matched for total 
sample 
PS-weighted for 
trimmed sample    
PS kernel-matched 





villages mean  s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean  s.e. 
Village characteristics (1995)                         
Total  population  0.009  -0.012  0.021 0.143 0.013 0.137 0.180 0.134  0.076 0.186  0.115  0.187 
Electricity  -0.151  0.196  -0.347  0.141  -0.229  0.138  -0.028  0.157  0.104  0.164 -0.268 0.147 
Phone  0.053  -0.069  0.122 0.143 0.109 0.141 0.373 0.132  0.155 0.168  0.072  0.171 
Road  -0.061  0.079  -0.139  0.143 -0.094  0.141 0.090 0.155  0.211 0.164  -0.130  0.134 
Radio  0.044  -0.058  0.102 0.143 0.075 0.135 0.241 0.126  0.271 0.155  0.193  0.170 
TV  -0.084  0.109  -0.193  0.142 -0.131  0.143 0.056 0.152  0.117 0.175  -0.136  0.163 
Nearest market <5km  -0.036  0.047  -0.083  0.143  -0.068  0.148  0.100  0.152  0.078  0.187  0.417  0.206 
Elementary school in village  -0.009  0.011  -0.02  0.143  -0.031  0.143  0.102  0.129  -0.075  0.182  -0.005  0.18 
Clinic in village  0.021  -0.028  0.049  0.143  0.051  0.141  0.258  0.129  0.043  0.170  0.073  0.172 
Net income per capita  -0.162  0.211  -0.373  0.141  -0.241  0.142  0.133  0.124  0.073  0.164  0.094  0.171 
Cultivated land per capita  0.134  -0.173  0.307  0.141  0.238  0.135  0.251  0.122  0.299  0.151  -0.159  0.144 
Household  outcomes  (1996)             
Consumption per capita   -0.156  0.203  -0.36  0.141  -0.217  0.190  -0.195  0.206  -0.069  0.181  -0.007  0.181 
Income per capita   -0.168  0.219  -0.39  0.141  -0.23  0.139  -0.238  0.137  -0.182  0.181  -0.153  0.185 
Headcount poverty index                          
___600 yuan (income)  0.175  -0.227  0.402  0.141  0.384  0.169  0.442  0.18  0.248  0.201  0.244  0.234 
___808 yuan (income)  0.196  -0.256  0.452  0.14  0.345  0.172  0.375  0.196  0.194  0.192  0.108  0.194 
___1000  yuan  (income)  0.212  -0.277  0.489 0.139  0.41 0.202 0.457 0.256  0.165 0.201  0.062  0.216 
___600 yuan (consumption)  0.161  -0.21  0.371  0.141  0.455  0.186  0.534  0.18  0.259  0.198  0.325  0.214 
___808 yuan (consumption)  0.155  -0.202  0.357  0.141  0.253  0.194  0.242  0.213  0.07  0.194  0.008  0.218 
___1000  yuan  (consumption)  0.171  -0.222  0.393 0.141 0.319 0.268 0.291 0.308  0.006 0.182  -0.130  0.203 
Notes: * (sub-group mean minus mean for full sample)/standard deviation for full sample.  In total sample, there are 112 project villages’ 86 comparison villages. 
In the trimmed sample, there are 71 project villages and 66 comparison villages.  Household income, consumption and poverty measures are weighted by 
household size.  The Addendum provides further balancing tests. 